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FIVE RECURRING PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN COURTS AND ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
Iris Ng, Melissa Ng,+ Andre Soh± & Chen Siyuan⊥  
Abstract 
In recent years, five recurring problems regarding the relationship between courts and tribunals have gained 
prominence due to case law developments. These run the gamut from preliminary issues with the arbitration agreement 
to disputes at the enforcement stage. This article examines these problems in detail, with a view to shed new light on 
the question of what it means for a jurisdiction to be “pro-arbitration”. The authors argue that the oft-repeated 
binary categorisation of “pro-arbitration” and “anti-arbitration” jurisdictions is too broad-brush. Instead, there is 
no easy answer to what constitutes a truly “pro-arbitration” approach, and no one-size-fits-all approach to being a 
“pro-arbitration” jurisdiction. 
I. Introduction 
The relationship between national courts and arbitral tribunals is an evergreen topic that has 
generated much discussion.1 In this article, we take a closer look at five recurring problems that 
have gained fresh currency due to case law developments from various jurisdictions. First, when 
can parties appeal from a tribunal’s decision to a court (or vice versa), or to another tribunal? 
Second, how does the availability of court review of the tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 16(3)2 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law [“Model Law”] affect the availability of other avenues to challenge 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction, such as setting-aside proceedings under Article 34 or enforcement 
proceedings under Article 36? Third, what can a party do when it is on the receiving end of a foreign 
judgment, when it would prefer to arbitrate the dispute or enforce an award? Fourth, when, if ever, 
should awards annulled at the seat be enforced by the national courts of another jurisdiction, under 
Article V(1)(e) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards [“NYC”]? Fifth, when can enforcement be refused under Article V(1)(d) of the NYC? By 
examining the approaches to these five specific problems, some insight can be gained into the 
overarching question of whether there is truly a dichotomy between jurisdictions that are “pro-
arbitration” and “anti-arbitration.”  
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1 See, e.g., Elizabeth Gloster, Symbiosis or Sadomasochism? The relationship between the courts and arbitration, 34(3) ARB. INT’L 
321 (2018); Emmanuel Gaillard, Coordination or chaos: Do the principles of comity, lis pendens, and res judicata apply to international 
arbitration?, 29(3) AM. REV. INT’L L. 205 (2019).  
2  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration art. 16(3), G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985), as amended by G.A Res. 61/33, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter “Model Law”]. 
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II. Problem 1: Exploring the Possibility of Appeals to and from Arbitral Tribunals 
In arbitration, as parties have made their bed, so they must lie in it. Those who opt for arbitration 
“must live with the decision of the arbitrator, good or bad. Commercial parties appoint arbitrators for their expertise 
and experience – technical, legal, commercial or otherwise.”3 This part of the article examines the ways that 
parties may get around the notion of “no merits review”4 of an award, and conversely, whether 
arbitration may provide additional recourse when parties are unhappy with the result of litigation.  
A. Appealing against an Arbitral Award 
The questions for consideration are – first, what are the circumstances in which a national court 
will entertain an appeal on the merits against an arbitral award, and second, whether parties can agree 
to an appeal mechanism from one tribunal to another. 
B. Appeals to a National Court  
International arbitration awards cannot generally be judicially reviewed on the merits.5 Parties are 
entitled to a fair decision, but not necessarily a correct one.6 However, there is at least one well-
established exception that parties should pay attention to: appealing an arbitration award on a point 
of law. While not contemplated by the Model Law, this is an option under Section 69 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 [“UKAA”],7 and items 5 and 6 of Schedule 2 to the Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance [“HKAO”]. 8  Singapore is also considering the amendment of its international 
arbitration statute to allow appeals on points of law on similar grounds.9 
Provisions allowing for appeals on points of law serve the public interest in re-introducing 
important questions of law to be decided by the courts, rather than behind closed doors in 
arbitration.10 The approaches under the statutes mentioned are broadly similar, with parties being 
permitted to appeal to the court only on a question of law arising out of an award. An appeal may 
not be brought unless all parties agree, or with the leave of the court. If leave is sought, the test 
requires, amongst others, that “the decision of the tribunal be obviously wrong or the question is one of general 
public importance and the tribunal’s decision is at least open to serious doubt”.11 The main difference is that 
the HKAO distinguishes between domestic and international arbitration, with automatic opt-in to 
 
3 TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v. Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd., [2013] 4 SLR. 972, ¶ 65 (Sing.). 
4  Generally, the substantive merits of the decision rendered an arbitral tribunal cannot be reviewed by a court or any 
other tribunal. 
5  Jessica L. Gelander, Judicial Review of International Arbitral Awards: Preserving Independence in International Commercial 
Arbitrations, 80(2) MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627 (1997). 
6 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3170 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter “BORN”]. 
7  Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 6, § 69 (Eng.) provides that “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral 
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising 
out of an award made in the proceedings. An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be 
considered an agreement to exclude the court’s jurisdiction under this section.” [hereinafter “UKAA”]. 
8  Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 609, sch. 2, items 5, 6 (H.K.) [hereinafter “Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance”]. 
9 Sebastian Perry, Singapore considers allowing appeals on questions of law (Apr. 15, 2019), GLOBAL ARB. REV., available at 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1190225/singapore-considers-allowing-appeals-on-questions-of-law. 
This procedure is already available in domestic arbitration, where the right to appeal applies unless excluded by parties. 
The proposed amendment in international arbitration would apply on an opt-in basis.  
10 The Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales Lord, The Bailii Lecture 
2016, ¶ 23 (Mar. 9, 2016), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/lcj-speech-bailli-
lecture-20160309.pdf. 
11  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, sch. 5, item 4(c); UKAA, § 69(3)(c). 
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items 5–6 of Schedule 2 available only for domestic arbitration.12 The HKAO also provides for 
deeming provisions in subcontracting cases if the opt-in provisions apply to the head contract.13 
Parties who wish to appeal under this route should note the following practical points: 
First, the key determinant would be the selection of the seat, i.e., the lex arbitri. Only if the relevant 
statute contemplates appeals to a national court on a point of law will such a right of recourse be 
countenanced. 
Second, the preconditions for invoking this right of appeal must be considered. For instance, a party 
may be required to exhaust all available arbitral processes of review and any available recourse 
under national law (for e.g., “correction of award or additional award”).14 They should also be mindful 
of any inadvertent waivers, such as by agreeing to dispense with the reasons for a tribunal’s award 
(which stands to reason, as a court cannot be expected to scrutinise a non-speaking award).15 
Logically, the appeal mechanism would also not be available if parties agree that the tribunal may 
decide ex aequo et bono (from equity and conscience), because there simply would be no question of 
law for the court to determine.  
Third, the parties must consider whether the appeal mechanism applies on an opt-in or opt-out 
basis,16 and if the former, it ought to be clarified at which stage the agreement should be made. It 
may be worthwhile including an opt-in provision at the outset in drafting the arbitration agreement, 
or at the latest, before the award is rendered, to avoid the need to obtain leave of court. Parties 
seeking to appeal against an arbitral award on a point of law, without the other party’s consent, 
face an uphill task due to the stringent requirements of the test for grant of leave. The numbers 
speak for themselves: In 2017, 56 applications for leave were brought under Section 69 of the 
UKAA, permission for leave was granted in ten cases, and only one case was successful (which 
was a significant improvement from the previous year!).17 
C. Appeals to an Appellate Arbitral Tribunal  
Given the narrow circumstances in which appeals to national courts may be made on the merits, 
an alternative would be to include an appellate arbitration clause. Such clauses permit the parties, 
if dissatisfied with the decision of a first arbitral tribunal, to appeal to another tribunal.18 Appellate 
arbitration clauses can take various forms, such as a two-tier arbitration clause where parties 
assemble their own preferred appeal mechanism. An example of this is the clause in Centrotrade:19 
 
12  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, § 100. 
13 Id. § 101. 
14 UKAA, § 70(2).  
15 See id. § 69(1).  
16 In opt-in cases, the appeal mechanism is available only if parties so provide in their arbitration agreement (as would 
be the case under the proposed amendments to Singapore’s International Arbitration Act). In opt-out cases, the appeal 
mechanism is available by default, unless parties contract out. See id. § 69(1). 
17 Commercial Court Users’ Group, Meeting Report 1 (Mar. 13, 2018), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/commercial-court-users-group-report.pdf. 
18 Prachi Aggarwal, Multi-tier Arbitration Clauses, RMLNLU L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2017), available at 
https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2017/10/25/multi-tier-arbitration-clauses/; Gracious Timothy Dunna, Supreme Court 
in Centrotrade 2016: Too Quick to Nod at the Validity of the Two-Tier Arbitration Clause?, 14(1) ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 58 (2018). 
19 M/s Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2017) 2 SCC 228, ¶ 3 (India) [hereinafter 
“Centrotrade II”]. 
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“Arbitration – All disputes or differences whatsoever arising between the parties […] shall be settled by 
arbitration in India through the arbitration panel of the Indian Council of Arbitration in accordance with 
the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration[…] 
If either party is in disagreement with the arbitration result in India, either party will have the right to 
appeal to a second arbitration in London, UK in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce[.]”20 
Alternatively, parties may incorporate in their arbitration agreement an institutional arbitration 
procedure, such as those offered by the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution, 2007 [“CPR Appeal Procedure”], the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services 
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedure, 2014 [“JAMS Appeal Procedure”], or the 
American Arbitration Association Appellate Arbitration Rules, 2013 [“AAA Appeal Procedure”].  
i. Validity of Appellate Arbitration Clauses 
A preliminary issue is whether such clauses will be regarded as valid by national courts, and if so, 
for what purposes. The Supreme Court of India recently held in the affirmative when it had to 
occasion to consider the question in Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc v. Hindustan Copper Ltd.21 
[“Centrotrade (II)”]. The decision is significant because the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, 1996 [“ACA”] is based on the provisions of the Model Law.22  
In Centrotrade (II), the appellate arbitration clause was in the form provided as an example above. 
The court rejected the submission that the latter part of the clause which set out the appellate 
mechanism, was contrary to Indian law. First, the court disagreed that the right to file an appeal 
can only be created by statute and not by an agreement between the parties. That holds true for 
litigation, but not non-statutory appeals that can be dealt with without resorting to court 
processes. 23  Second, the validity of appellate arbitration clauses is supported by background 
materials such as the Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law and the 
Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: 
Report of the Secretary-General [“Analytical Commentary”]. Third, the principle of party 
autonomy supports the acceptance of appellate arbitration clauses.24 
The clause in Centrotrade (II) was upheld even though it provided for arbitration under the rules of 
the Indian Council of Arbitration [“ICA”] in the first instance, and International Chamber of 
Commerce [“ICC”] arbitration on appeal. But such “Frankenstein” clauses 25  are not always 
workable, especially where parties incorporate an institutional arbitration procedure. For instance, 
the JAMS Appeal Procedure only applies to awards that have been rendered under the JAMS 
 
20  Shivansh Jolly, Supreme Court of India Upholds Validity of Appellate Arbitration Clauses, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 16, 2017) 
available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/02/16/supreme-court-india-upholds-validity-
appellate-arbitration-clauses. 
21  Centrotrade II, (2017) 2 SCC 228. 
22  Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, pmbl. (India) [hereinafter “Indian Arbitration Act”].  
23 Centrotrade II, (2017) 2 SCC 228, ¶ 14.  
24 Id. ¶ 40.    
25 So-called because they are assembled of a mish-mash of parts and may not function as envisaged, much like the 
eponymous monster.  
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Arbitration Rules.26 The CPR Appeal Procedure applies to “any binding arbitration conducted in the 
United States, pursuant to the CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration or the CPR Administered 
Arbitration Rules […] or otherwise.”27 What happens if the first-tier clause is valid but the appellate 
mechanism is not?  
One would imagine that the courts, by applying the principle of effective interpretation, will adopt 
a very forgiving approach and uphold at least the first-tier arbitration clause once they find an 
intention to arbitrate – recall Lucky-Goldstar Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Engineering,28 where the clause 
referred to non-existent rules of arbitration, and there was uncertainty as to the arbitral institution 
and place of arbitration. In this case, it was held that the clause was not “inoperative or incapable of 
being performed” and that the intention of the parties to arbitrate was clear. A counter argument 
would be that parties had intended to arbitrate conditional upon having the right to appeal to an 
appellate tribunal, and the lack of the latter makes the clause unworkable. However, such an 
argument is unlikely to succeed: if courts are willing to accept even “bare” arbitration clauses,29 (as 
they have in certain pro-arbitration jurisdictions),30 there is no reason why they would not do the 
same when only the appellate portion of the clause is in doubt. Hence, it is quite likely that appellate 
arbitration clauses will be found workable regardless of their form, even if they are contrary to 
specific institutional appellate arbitration procedures.  
But that begs a logically prior question. Assuming that the first-instance arbitration is seated in 
country ‘X’, the appellate arbitration in country ‘Y’, and the substantive law of the contract is that 
of country ‘Z’, which law determines whether the arbitration agreement is valid? The threshold 
issue is whether the Sulamerica approach31 applies, i.e., where the arbitration agreement forms part 
of the main contract, parties are presumed to have intended the same law to govern both the 
underlying contract and the arbitration agreement. 32  If so, the law governing the arbitration 
agreement is that of country Z. However, the Sulamerica approach is not universally adopted, and 
an alternative approach is to apply the law of the seat to assess the validity of an arbitration 
agreement.33 The latter approach, however, would pose another problem: which seat’s laws would 
be relevant – those of country X (where the first-instance arbitration is seated) or Y (where 
appellate arbitration is seated)? The better view is that it would be the law of the country where 
the first-instance arbitration is seated, i.e., country X. The contrary view entails some circularity 
because country Y would only be the seat if the clause were valid and encompassed the possibility 
of an appellate arbitration, but the very question here is whether that clause is valid. But what if 
 
26 Theodore K. Cheng, Merits-Based Review of Arbitration Awards: A Potentially “Appealing” Option, 22(2) N.Y. STUDENT BAR 
ASS’N NY LITIGATOR 21, 22 (2017). 
27 International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution [CPR] Appellate Arbitration Procedure, r. 1.1, 2015.  
28 Lucky-Goldstar Int’l (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Eng’g, [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 73C. (H.C.) (H.K.). 
29  Bare arbitration clauses do not mention the place of arbitration nor the means of appointing arbitrators. Darius Chan, 
How Should “Bare” Arbitration Clauses Be Enforced by the Courts?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2017), available at 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/04/11/how-should-bare-arbitration-clauses-be-enforced-by-the-
courts/. 
30 See, e.g., KVC Rice Intertrade Co. Ltd. v. Asian Mineral Res. Pte Ltd., [2017] 32 S.G.H.C. 43–48 (Sing.). 
31 Sulamerica CIA Nacional de Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. [2012] EWCA Civ. 638 (Eng.). 
32  Ashurst, Which law governs the arbitration agreement: the law of the seat or the underlying contract? (Feb. 7, 2017), available at 
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/which-law-governs-the-arbitration-agreement-the-
law-of-the-seat-or-the-underlying-contract/. 
33 See, e.g., FirstLink Inv. Corp. Ltd. v. GT Payment Pte Ltd., [2014] SGHCR. 12 (Sing.); Cf. BCY v. BCZ, [2017] 3 SLR 
357 (Sing.). 
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the arbitration agreement is valid only under the laws of country Y? This might be resolved by 
applying the validation principle, which is that the validity of an arbitration clause will be upheld if 
it is valid under any of the potentially applicable laws (here, any of countries X, Y, or Z), even if it 
is invalid under all the other potentially applicable laws.34 All things considered, courts are likely to 
uphold the validity of appellate arbitration clauses.  
ii.  Practical Considerations in Deciding whether to agree to Appellate Arbitration Clauses 
Deciding on whether to agree to appellate arbitration clauses involves weighing various 
considerations. Without such a clause there might be greater speed and finality in the arbitral 
process,35 but parties would have to live with the outcome, unless the award can be challenged on 
due process or other grounds. On the other hand, the security of having a right of appeal against 
the award might be the very reason why parties accept a one-member tribunal for disputes that 
might have otherwise warranted a three-member tribunal, thus leading to time and cost savings.36 
Speed and finality are also not a given, if the counterparty tries to set aside the award or plays cat-
and-mouse with enforcement.37 Determining whether to include such clauses would, therefore, 
require careful gauging of the counterparty’s track record, the state of the parties’ relationship, and 
other relevant indicia. 
We also highlight the following practical considerations:  
First, parties should note that institutional rules chosen by them might provide for specific grounds 
or standards of appeal.38 
Second, if an appellate arbitration clause is adopted, there is a question as to whether the seat court 
of the first-instance award can entertain applications for setting aside or enforcement pending the 
award being reviewed on appeal. We agree with the view that this should be disallowed as it would 
contradict the principles of judicial economy and efficiency when an appellate arbitration clause 
has been agreed upon by the parties.39 There is also the concern of the appellate arbitration award 
being rendered nugatory or futile, if enforcement efforts have caused irremediable damage.  
Third, parties should note when the limitation period for seeking to set aside an award commences 
(if they have not selected institutional appellate procedures that provide for this).40 Would this be 
from the date of the first award or appellate award? This is significant because the timeline can in 
some cases be as short as three months. The answer to this question might well be found in Article 
34(3) of the Model Law,41 which states:  
 
34 Gary Born, The Law Governing International Arbitration Agreements: An International Perspective, 26 SING. ACAD. L. J. 814, ¶ 
51 (2014). 
35 Though it should be noted that problems of speed and finality might be mitigated if parties also set a mutually 
acceptable time limit for invoking the arbitral appeal mechanism. 
36 Theodore K. Cheng, supra note 26, at 21, 32.  
37 See, e.g., the long-running Astro v. Lippo saga spanning Singapore and Hong Kong. 
38 See, e.g., under AAA’s Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules, r. A-10 (2013), the award must contain “material and 
prejudicial” errors of law or have “clearly erroneous” determinations of fact. 
39 Validity of Appellate Arbitration Clauses, INT’L ARB. INFO. (Feb. 28, 2017), available at https://www.international-
arbitration-attorney.com/validity-appellate-arbitration-clauses. 
40 Shivansh Jolly, supra note 20. 
41 Model Law, supra note 2, art. 34(3). 
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“An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which 
the party making that application had received the award or, if a request had been made under Article 
33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.” [emphasis added] 
On a plain reading of Article 34(3), the time to set aside the first-instance and appellate awards will 
run from their respective times of receipt. Might this pose a problem for applicants who fear they 
will be out of time to challenge the first award, if this is upheld on appeal? It is no answer to say 
that a party can challenge the appellate award, because the grounds for challenge might not apply 
in a transferable way – a breach of natural justice in the first proceedings would not affect the 
appellate proceedings. The solution, perhaps, is to first commence setting aside proceedings for 
the first award in the seat court and have those proceedings stayed pending determination by the 
appellate tribunal. It may also be argued that any grant of a stay on the first award may be more 
palatable if it would include the payment of the full award amount, possibly into an escrow account, 
to extinguish liability pending the decision by the appellate tribunal. While this solution is a little 
cumbersome, inelegance is preferable to a party challenging the Article 34(3) timeline and finding, 
to its dismay, that it is non-extendable.42 
D. Appealing from a National Court Decision to an Arbitral Tribunal  
The final issue in this section is whether parties can appeal against the decision of a national court 
to an arbitral tribunal. The issue arises from a clause that featured in ST Group Co. Ltd. v. Sanum 
Investments Ltd. appeal [“Sanum (SGCA)”]. 43  The clause, reproduced below, provided for the 
parties to refer any disputes to mediation, and then either to the “Resolution of Economic Dispute 
Organisation” or the Laotian courts:  
“If one of the parties is unsatisfied with the results of the decision or judgment of the above procedure, the 
Parties shall mediate and, if necessary, arbitrate such dispute using an internationally recognized 
mediation/arbitration company in Macau, SAR PRC”.44  
While the Singapore Court of Appeal acknowledged that the clause may lead to appeals against 
concluded national proceedings using an arbitral tribunal, it declined to adjudicate upon the validity 
of such a clause given that it would be a matter to be decided under the governing law of the 
agreement, that being Lao law.45  
There are strong arguments against such clauses being upheld. First, is there even a “dispute” to be 
sent to arbitration? The tribunal might well determine, in the exercise of its competence under 
Article 16 of the Model Law, that the court’s decision is res judicata. A ruling of a competent court 
would conclusively resolve a dispute, subject to any possible appeals to national appellate courts. 
Second, it is questionable whether the parties could engraft, by their own fiat, a separate branch of 
appeals to an arbitral tribunal onto the appellate decision-tree. A “dispute” over a national court 
decision potentially falls under the non-arbitrability doctrine; national courts are meant to be the 
final arbiters of legal disputes within their jurisdiction. It is inherently objectionable that the 
decision of a national court as a manifestation of state authority should be appealable to arbitrators, 
 
42 See, e.g., BXS v. BXT, [2019] SGHC(I) 10, ¶¶ 37–41 (Sing.). 
43 ST Group Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Sanum Inv. Ltd. and Anr., [2019] SGCA 65 (Sing.).  
44  Id. ¶ 8. 
45  Id. ¶¶ 70–74. 
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who are appointed at the whim of parties without any assurance of legal training or quality (for ad 
hoc arbitrations). In a similar vein, it could be argued that allowing parties to appeal to an arbitral 
tribunal against a national court’s decision violates public policy.  
Third, there are difficulties arising from the mismatch over what the court, versus the arbitrator, 
can adjudicate and pronounce upon. Leaving aside whether the court decision per se is a priori non-
arbitrable regardless of subject matter, what happens if the court makes a ruling that affects third 
parties, or there is joinder of third parties in the course of proceedings? Can that part of the dispute 
be hived off and the rest sent to arbitration? Even if it could, what of the risk of potentially 
inconsistent findings of fact? Messy situations like these can be minimised by refusing to accept 
such arbitration clauses as valid, albeit that these may still arise in other circumstances (such as if 
the court decides to grant case management stays over certain parts of the dispute). Accordingly, 
it is suggested that such clauses should be void.  
E. Conclusion on Problem 1 
Provisions that provide either for appeal against an award to a court or tribunal, or for appeal from 
a court decision to an arbitral tribunal, test the limits to which courts in a broadly pro-arbitration 
climate will uphold party autonomy. In the authors’ view, while the former should be (and is) given 
effect to as far as possible, the latter should not be allowed.  
III. Problem 2: The Effect of Article 16(3) of the Model Law on Subsequent 
Challenges to the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction 
Article 16(3) of the Model Law entitles a party that is dissatisfied with a tribunal’s preliminary ruling 
on jurisdiction to request, within thirty days, the curial court to decide the issue of jurisdiction 
again.46 How does the availability of the Article 16(3) mechanism affect the parties’ right to 
challenge jurisdiction at the setting-aside and enforcement stages? In many jurisdictions, a party’s 
failure to raise an Article 16(3) challenge precludes any subsequent attempt to rely on the same 
ground.47 Interestingly, recent decisions by the Singapore courts have gone the other way. This 
section will discuss the interpretation of Article 16(3) taken by the Singapore courts, and evaluate 
the attractiveness of this approach against competing views taken elsewhere. 
A. Singapore’s Interpretation of Article 16(3) 
In PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV [“Astro”],48 the Singapore Court of 
Appeal held that even where a party failed to actively raise jurisdictional objections under Article 
16(3) of the Model Law in time, it was still open to such a party to raise those objections as a 
ground for refusing enforcement of the award (what the court referred to as a “passive remedy”). The 
court was satisfied, after analysing the travaux préparatoires, that the Model Law incorporates a “choice 
of remedies” system.49 Given the differences in purpose and effect between setting aside applications 
 
46  Model Law, supra note 2, art. 16(3) provides that “The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) 
of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary 
question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, 
the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request 
is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.”  
47  See Nata Ghibradze, Preclusion of Remedies under Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 27(1) PACE INT’L L. REV. 
345, 385-389 (2015). 
48 PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV, [2013] SGCA 57 (Sing.) [hereinafter “Astro”]. 
49 Id. ¶ 65. 
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and refusal of enforcement proceedings, “parties that do not actively attack an award remain able to 
passively rely on defences to enforcement.”50 After a perusal of the travaux, the Court observed that nothing 
suggested that Article 16(3), as another form of active challenge to a tribunal’s decision on 
jurisdiction, was intended to be carved out from this “choice of remedies” system.51 But the court left 
open the question of whether a party who failed to utilise the Article 16(3) challenge was still able 
to raise the same jurisdictional objection in setting-aside proceedings, although it expressed the 
tentative opinion that it would be “surprised” if the answer was in the affirmative.52 
That question was revisited by the Court of Appeal in May 2019, albeit for non-participating 
respondents only. In Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd. v. Avant Garde Maritime Services (Pte) Ltd. 
[“Rakna”],53 Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd. [“RALL”] did not participate in the arbitration at all 
due to its protest to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The tribunal issued a preliminary ruling stating that 
it had jurisdiction, to which RALL did not respond. After the final award was given in favour of 
Avant Garde Maritime Services (Pte) Ltd. [“AGMS”], RALL sought to set aside the award. The 
question was whether RALL was now precluded from raising the jurisdictional issue in setting-
aside proceedings, given its failure to raise an Article 16(3) challenge earlier.  
Reversing the decision of the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that a non-participating party in 
an arbitration was not precluded from applying to set aside an award on jurisdictional grounds, 
even if he had not raised those objections in an Article 16(3) challenge. Significantly, the court 
stated:54 
“Art 16 [of the Model Law] requires parties to an arbitration to bring out their challenges to jurisdiction 
at an early point of the proceedings. But this requirement pre-supposes that parties are before the arbitral 
tribunal and that a party to an arbitration agreement who is served with a notice of arbitration by a 
counterparty has no option but to participate in the ensuing proceedings.” 
The court reasoned that there is no clear legal duty on a respondent to participate in an arbitration 
that it believes was wrongly commenced against it. Accordingly, it would be wrong to force such 
a party to utilise the Article 16(3) mechanism despite its objections.55 The court also relied on the 
Analytical Commentary,56 which states that a non-participating party who did not “submit a statement 
or take part in hearings on the substance of the dispute” remains able to challenge jurisdiction in both 
setting aside or enforcement proceedings.57 
These decisions are unlikely to be the last word from the Singapore courts on this point, but it is 
clear that there are at least two exceptions to the preclusive effect of Article 16(3) under Singapore 
 
50 Id. ¶ 71. 
51 Id. ¶¶ 104–105, 111, 115, 123. 
52  Id. ¶¶ 130, 132. 
53 Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd v. Avant Garde Maritime Services (Pte) Ltd., [2019] SGCA 33 (Sing.) [hereinafter “Rakna”]. 
54 Id. ¶ 72. 
55  Id. ¶ 73. 
56 UNCITRAL Sey. Gen., Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Rep. of 
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25, 1985) [hereinafter “Analytical Commentary”]. 
57 Id. at 39. 
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law (subject to other doctrines like waiver and estoppel). 58  Where a respondent refuses to 
participate in the arbitration at all, he may still apply to set aside any award against him later on 
jurisdictional grounds. Moreover, even if a party chooses not to mount an active challenge to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction (under Article 16(3) or Article 34), it may resist enforcement on the same 
grounds. 
B. Other Interpretations of Article 16(3) 
Against the approach taken in Singapore, the prevailing view in Germany, Canada, Hong Kong, 
and Australia is that Article 16(3) is the only avenue for challenging a preliminary award on 
jurisdiction.59 Nata Ghibradze, undertaking a comprehensive survey of the case law on Article 
16(3), attributes this to “the primary purpose behind the mechanism of early determination of jurisdictional 
issues, legal certainty and efficiency.”60 In China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee 
Tai Holdings Co. Ltd. [“China Nanhai Oil”], the Hong Kong High Court stated in obiter that “if 
you do not seek the view of the court [under Article 16(3)], then you cannot raise the matter subsequently at [the] 
enforcement stage.”61 The Supreme Court of Quebec, in Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Libyan Arab 
Airlines [“Compagnie”], held that Article 943.1 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure (the 
equivalent of Article 16(3)) was the sole means of contesting the tribunal’s preliminary ruling on 
jurisdiction – thus, excluding both setting aside and refusal of enforcement options.62 
There is some support in the travaux préparatoires for this view. In particular, the Analytical 
Commentary and Working Group Reports show that the drafters’ concerns behind Article 16 of 
the Model Law were in ensuring that any jurisdictional objections were raised early. It was stated 
by the UN Secretariat, in a comment on Article 16(3):63 
“Where the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, article 16(3) provides 
for instant court control in order to avoid unnecessary waste of money and time. […] In those less common 
cases where the arbitral tribunal combines its decision on jurisdiction with an award on the merits, judicial 
review on the question of jurisdiction is available in setting aside proceedings under article 34 or in 
enforcement proceedings under article 36.” 
This comment leaves the effect of not utilising Article 16(3) ambiguous, but it has been suggested 
that these words indicate the drafters’ intention of carving out Article 16(3) from the “choice of 
remedies” system.64 
 
58 Astro, [2013] SGCA 57, ¶¶ 199–202 (Sing.). It is stated in ¶ 200 that “the concept of waiver and estoppel are distinct. 
Broadly speaking, waiver of rights occurs when a party has indicated that it will be relinquishing its rights. Estoppel, 
however, requires something more. The party invoking the estoppel must typically show that it had relied on the 
representations of the other party to its detriment”. 
59 See Ghibradze, supra note 47, at 385–389; Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The Adoption and Application of the Model Law in 
Canada – Post-Arbitration Challenge, 18(2) J. INT’L ARB. 191, 200–201 (2001). 
60 Ghibradze, supra note 47, at 385–389. 
61 China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd., [1994] 3 H.K.C. 375, 
676–677 (H.C.) (H.K.). 
62 Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Libyan Arab Airlines, [2000] R.J.Q. 717 (Can. Que.); Ghibradze, supra note 477, 
at 387. 
63 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Note, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/309, reprinted in [1988] 19 
UNCITRAL Y.B., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1988, ¶ 25. 
64 Ghibradze, supra note 47, at 384; BORN, supra note 6, at 3019, where the author states, “As discussed above, the better 
view is that positive jurisdictional rulings are properly characterised as awards, generally subject to annulment, 
recognition and enforcement like other awards, but national court authority on the subject remains divided.” 
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In our view, the divergent approaches taken by the jurisdictions outlined above (as well as eminent 
commentators)65 demonstrate – and stem in part from – the ambiguity of the drafters’ intention. 
Absent any clear direction in the Model Law or the travaux préparatoires, a principled interpretation 
of Article 16(3) must consider what this provision sets out to achieve in the entire context of the 
scheme and purpose of the Model Law. 
C. How Far should a Failure to Raise an Article 16(3) Challenge Preclude Setting Aside or Refusal 
of Enforcement on the Same Grounds? 
i. Failure to Raise Article 16(3) should not Preclude Resisting Enforcement on Jurisdictional Grounds 
Though much has been said about the drafters’ intentions of expediting jurisdictional challenges, 
the structure and provisions of the Model Law do not suggest that jurisdiction is a question best 
reserved only to the seat court, or that any jurisdictional questions must be resolved quickly within 
a predefined time frame. That the ground for refusing recognition and enforcement of an award for lack 
of jurisdiction exists in Article 36 of the Model Law, in tandem with Article V(1) of the NYC, 
suggests that leeway is given to the enforcing court to examine the question of jurisdiction for 
itself regardless of deference to the seat court.66 If so, there is no good reason why Article 16(3) 
must be carved out from the “choice of remedies” system, such that the enforcing court cannot 
consider the question of jurisdiction simply because it has been the subject of a preliminary ruling 
by the tribunal. 
The contrary view (i.e., that failing to raise Article 16(3) precludes resisting enforcement on 
jurisdictional grounds) would introduce an arbitrary imbalance in the scheme of remedies in the 
NYC and Model Law. Everything would turn on whether the tribunal decides to issue its decision 
on jurisdiction as a preliminary ruling, or together with the merits in a final award.67 If the tribunal 
addresses its jurisdiction only in a final award, Article 16(3) would not apply and a respondent has 
not one, but two chances to raise the jurisdictional objection (in setting aside, or refusing 
enforcement). On the other hand, if the tribunal chooses to issue a preliminary ruling, a dissatisfied 
party must invoke Article 16(3) or be bound by the tribunal’s decision. But why should a 
respondent in the latter case be penalised by losing its passive remedy on the jurisdictional point, 
simply due to the form taken by the tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling?  
ii. Failure to Raise Article 16(3) should Generally Preclude Setting Aside Applications on Jurisdictional Grounds 
except in Exceptional Circumstances  
In contrast to affirming the availability of passive remedies despite a failure to mount an Article 
16(3) challenge, we suggest a more nuanced approach as far as setting aside applications are 
 
65 For commentators more inclined to the view that Art. 16(3) is not preclusive, see, e.g., HOWARD HOLTZMANN & 
JOSEPH NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 479 (2015); INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMM. 
ARB., INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 84 (Jan Paulsson ed., 1990); Cf. KLAUS BERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 365 (1993). 
66 See Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Govt. of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, 
¶ 103 (Eng.). Lord Mance noted “Nor is there anything to support Dallah’s theory that the New York Convention 
accords primacy to the courts of the arbitral seat, in the sense that the supervisory court should be the only court 
entitled to carry out a re-hearing of the issue of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement […] There is nothing in 
the Convention which imposes an obligation on a party seeking to resist an award on the ground of the non-existence 
of an arbitration agreement to challenge the award before the courts of the seat”. 
67  UNCITRAL, 2012 DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
art. 16, ¶ 14, at 79. 
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concerned: A party who fails to invoke Article 16(3) should generally be precluded from relying 
on the same annulment ground, except in circumstances where the Article 16(3) mechanism was 
not reasonably available.68 
There is force in the view that a respondent who could have raised an Article 16(3) challenge, but 
chose not to do so, should not be allowed to raise the same objection in setting aside later. Both 
Article 16(3) and annulment lead to a final determination by the seat court on the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.69 Since Article 16(3) was drafted to discourage a party from sitting on jurisdictional 
objections, it ought to have preclusive effect on any attempt to raise (at setting aside) a 
jurisdictional objection that could reasonably have been raised earlier.70 
But there are situations where a party cannot sensibly be expected to have recourse to Article 16(3). 
It is undesirable to impose a blanket rule that Article 16(3) definitively precludes any later challenge 
under Article 34. In Rakna, the Singapore Court of Appeal stated without qualification that a “non-
participating respondent” is one exception to the preclusive effect of Article 16(3).71 On the facts, 
though Rakna dealt only with a fully non-participating respondent, who did not engage in the 
arbitration at all (beyond sending letters to the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
[“SIAC”]) and had made clear its intention to stay away from the beginning. As commentators 
have pointed out, it may be useful to analyse the position of different types of non-participants:72 
1. For fully non-participating respondents, like in Rakna, these parties did not engage in the 
arbitral process at all, and it would be clear to the claimant in such cases that the respondent 
cannot be said to have waived its right to object to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.73 By not 
participating, these respondents also do not contribute to the wasted costs and time in the 
arbitration.74 Fully non-participating respondents would not run afoul of the purpose of 
Article 16(3), i.e., to require parties to bring their jurisdictional objections early instead of 
waiting until the award was rendered. 
2. For partially non-participating respondents, however, the position is less clear. It may very 
well depend on how far the respondent chose to participate in the arbitral process before 
 
68  See, e.g., Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [HansOLG] [Hanseatic Higher Regional Court Hamburg] Nov. 
8, 2001, CLOUT Case No. 562, 6 Sch. 04/01 (Ger.), where a party that had not raised any jurisdictional objection 
before the arbitral tribunal was later allowed to do so in setting-aside proceedings, because it had not been properly 
informed of the commencement of the arbitration. 
69  Arts. 16(3) and 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law both subject the tribunal’s power to rule on its own competence to final 
judicial control: see Analytical Commentary, supra note 56, at 122, ¶¶ 11–12. 
70 See, e.g., the SGCA’s obiter statements in Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶ 130 states that the court would be “surprised if 
a party retained the right to bring a setting-aside application on a ground which they could have raised via other active 
remedies before the supervising court at an earlier stage when the arbitration was still ongoing”. 
71 Rakna, [2019] SGCA 33, ¶ 74. 
72 Darius Chan, Is Article 16(3) of the Model Law a ‘One-Shot Remedy’ for Non-Participating Respondents in International 
Arbitrations?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 5, 2018), available at 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/09/05/article-163-model-law-one-shot-remedy-non-
participating-respondents-international-arbitrations-2; Albert Monichino QC, The Problem with Rakna: The Scope of the 
Preclusive Effect of Article 16(3) of the Model Law, 31 SING. ACAD. L.J. 349, ¶ 38 (2019) [hereinafter “Monichino”]. 
73 Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT Ayunda Prima Mitra, [2013] 1 SLR 636, ¶ 133 (Sing.); See also Analytical 
Commentary, supra note 57, at 122, ¶ 9, where despite the view that the failure to raise the Art. 16(3) challenge in time 
precludes any arguments on jurisdiction later on, it is stated that such arguments “would remain applicable and of 
practical relevance to those cases where a party raised the plea in time but without success or where a party did not 
participate in the arbitration”. 
74 Monichino, supra note 72, ¶ 40. 
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stepping out. It has been suggested that a respondent who participates in the arbitration to 
contest the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and who immediately steps out of the proceedings after 
the tribunal renders a preliminary ruling unfavourable to it, arguably did not prolong the 
dispute or contribute to wasted costs despite its limited participation. 75  We would, 
however, point out that there is nothing unfair about requiring a respondent who willingly 
participated in a preliminary hearing on jurisdiction to use the full range of measures 
available to challenge jurisdiction immediately, including invoking the Article 16(3) 
challenge. 
D. Conclusion on Problem 2 
The extent to which Article 16(3) precludes subsequent attempts to set aside or resist enforcement 
of an award on jurisdictional grounds varies by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions, such as the 
Singapore courts, adopt a somewhat more “interventionist” approach, and are inclined to allow 
parties more opportunities to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction before the courts. On the other 
hand, other courts have been strict on limiting the parties’ jurisdictional challenge to Article 16(3). 
It is difficult to say which is truly a more “pro-arbitration” view. Arguably, both approaches can be 
justified on upholding either speed and finality, or ensuring the correctness of jurisdictional 
decisions, in the arbitral process. Therefore, in selecting the arbitral seat and potential places for 
subsequent enforcement of the award, parties should consider the legal position of these courts 
on the effect of Article 16(3) beforehand, and take steps to safeguard their right to challenge the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction before the court.  
IV. Problem 3: The Availability of Anti-Enforcement Injunctions from Seat Courts  
Two recent English and Singapore cases affirm a very restrictive approach to the grant of anti-
enforcement injunctions [“AEI(s)”], requiring “exceptional circumstances” beyond the threshold 
considered for the grant of anti-suit injunctions [“ASI(s)”]. What can a party do when it is faced 
with a foreign judgment, when it would prefer to arbitrate the dispute or enforce an award? There 
are several potential options, which this part of the article will explore after giving a brief overview 
of the two types of injunction and the cases on this.  
A. Definitions  
ASIs restrain ongoing court proceedings. They can be issued in pre-award situations to restrain a 
party from commencing litigation in breach of an arbitration agreement, as well as in post-award 
situations to restrain a party from challenging the award outside the seat, or litigating claims that 
have already been determined in arbitration.76 The focus here is on ASIs granted in breach of an 
arbitration clause, i.e., “contractual” ASIs. AEIs, on the other hand, come into the picture after a 
foreign court issues a judgment. They restrain a party from relying on or enforcing that foreign 
judgment.77 The difference between ASIs and AEIs is usefully thought of as: the former concerns 
the working of a foreign court and the latter with their output.78 
 
75 Id. ¶¶ 44–45. 
76 Terna Bahrain Holding Co. WLL v. Al Shamsi and Ors. [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 86 (Eng.); Michael Wilson and Partners 
Ltd. v. Emmott [2018] EWCA (Civ.) 51 (Eng.).  
77 Ecobank Transnat’l Inc. v. Tanoh [2015] EWCA (Civ.) 1309 (Eng.) [hereinafter “Ecobank”]. 
78 Id. ¶ 91. 
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B. The Authorities – Two Recent Cases from England and Singapore  
In Ecobank Transnational Inc v. Tanoh [“Ecobank”],79 Ecobank and Mr. Tanoh were parties to an 
employment agreement containing an arbitration clause. In breach of that clause, Mr. Tanoh 
commenced proceedings in the courts of Togo and Cote d’Ivoire and obtained judgment in his 
favour. Subsequently, Ecobank obtained an ex parte interim injunction barring Mr. Tanoh from 
seeking recognition or enforcement of either foreign judgment.80 The English Court of Appeal 
upheld the High Court’s judgment discharging the interim injunction. Despite the fact that Mr. 
Tanoh’s claims were brought in breach of the arbitration agreement and the bank had not 
submitted to the foreign courts,81 an AEI was nonetheless refused. 
The English authorities where AEIs were granted are “few and far between”.82 Such circumstances 
would include: (i) fraud on the part of the party obtaining the foreign judgment; (ii) where a 
judgment was obtained too quickly or secretly to enable an ASI to be obtained, and (iii) where a 
party could not have sought relief pre-judgment because either the exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
was reached post-judgment or he had no means of knowing that the judgment was being sought.83 
Further, delay in seeking injunctive relief was an important consideration, justified by a “variety of 
reasons including the avoidance of prejudice, detriment and waste of judicial resources; the need for finality; and 
considerations of comity.”84 In the court’s words, an applicant must act promptly and claim injunctive 
relief early, “and should not adopt an attitude of waiting to see what the foreign court decides”.85 Finally, the 
AEI was discharged because the bank could have sought an ASI at the outset of foreign 
proceedings but decided not to.  
Sun Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. v. Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt. Ltd. [“Sun Travels”],86 
concerned a Singapore-seated arbitration in which the tribunal rendered two awards against Sun. 
Hilton sought to enforce the award in the Maldives but ran into difficulties due to confusion about 
which Maldivian court had jurisdiction over enforcement. In the meantime, Sun commenced an 
action in the Maldives, essentially re-litigating the decided issues. Instead of immediately applying 
for anti-suit relief from the seat court, Hilton challenged the Maldivian action and failed. The 
Maldivian court issued judgment in favour of Sun. Hilton continued its attempt to enforce the 
awards, but enforcement was denied due to the Maldivian judgment.87 Hilton appealed against the 
Maldivian judgment, while seeking (amongst others) a permanent ASI from the Singapore court 
to prevent Sun from relying on the Maldivian judgment. Instead of an ASI, an AEI was granted 
by the High Court,88 but was later discharged by the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with Ecobank that “great caution” should be exercised in granting AEIs 
because such an injunction would necessarily not have been sought promptly enough.89 AEIs 
 
79  Id. 
80  Id. ¶ 24. 
81  Id. ¶ 79. 
82  Id. ¶ 118. 
83 Id. ¶ 119. 
84 Id. ¶¶ 126–127. 
85  Id. ¶ 129. 
86 Sun Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. v. Hilton Internat’l Manage (Maldives) Pvt. Ltd., [2019] SGCA 10 (Sing.) [hereinafter 
“Sun Travels”]. 
87  Id. ¶ 2. 
88  Id. ¶ 43. 
89 Id. ¶¶ 89-90. 
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would be granted only “very sparingly” and only where “exceptional circumstances” can be shown.90 The 
test for when an AEI would be granted must be more stringent than that for ASIs because an AEI 
proscribes the enforcement of a foreign judgment on pain of contempt proceedings in the 
jurisdiction where the injunction is granted.91 Granting an AEI would be “comparable to nullifying the 
foreign judgment, […] when only the foreign court can set aside or vary its own judgments.”92  
Thus, to obtain an AEI, the applicant must show not only the breach of a legal right (i.e., breach 
of agreement), 93  but also “exceptional circumstances.” 94  A non-exhaustive list of exceptional 
circumstances would include: (i) unconscionable conduct such as fraud, or (ii) when the applicant 
is not guilty of unconscionable delay, such as when it did not know of the foreign proceedings 
until delivery of the judgment.95 However, the Singapore Court of Appeal did not consider the 
third exception in Ecobank (as discussed above) as a standalone ground.96 The AEI was discharged 
because of Hilton’s delay, which had resulted in the delivery of two Maldivian enforcement 
judgments and the filing of a Maldivian appeal.97 
C. Discussion 
i. Option 1: Argue against a Stricter Approach towards AEIs than ASIs 
In jurisdictions where the matter has not been conclusively decided, the question arises whether a 
party should argue against a stricter approach towards AEIs compared to contractual ASIs, which 
are granted by default unless there are strong reasons not to.98 The stricter approach towards AEIs 
is premised on the view that AEIs are more injurious to comity.  
Comity in Ecobank was unpacked as comprising two facets: (i) comity vis-à-vis the prospective 
enforcing court, which has autonomy to decide whether to enforce a particular foreign judgment in 
accordance with its own law; and (ii) comity vis-à-vis the court issuing the foreign judgment, in 
terms of waste of foreign judicial resources.99 
The first facet might be disputed. In ICC Case No. 17176,100 the tribunal considered that an ASI is 
“inherently more invasive” than an AEI, i.e., that an ASI would be more injurious to comity than an 
AEI.101 The logic is that an AEI does not cast aspersions on the competence of another court (as 
the pre-emptive nature of an ASI may be perceived to do), but only prevents the individual 
 
90 Id. ¶ 121. 
91  Id. ¶ 98. 
92 Id. 
93 Or, where non-contractual ASIs are concerned, vexatious or oppressive conduct.  
94 Sun Travels, [2019] SGCA 10, ¶¶ 99, 105 where it is stated that the requirement of “exceptional circumstances” is traceable 
to the origins of an injunction as a form of equitable relief. 
95 Id. ¶ 113. 
96 Id. ¶ 104. 
97 Id. ¶ 125. 
98 Donohue v. Armco Inc [2002] 1 All ER 749.  
99 Ecobank, [2015] EWCA (Civ.) 1309, ¶¶ 129, 132–133, 135. 
100 ICC Case No. 17176, Final Award, [2016] 41 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 86–126 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed.) (The tribunal 
had in a procedural order granted an interim AEI directing the respondents to refrain from enforcing any judgment 
rendered in state litigation for patent infringement claims before a final award was rendered in the arbitration. In its 
final award, it declined the grant of a permanent AEI because the situation had changed – the tribunal had in the final 
award found that the claimants could argue that they were licensed, with the consequence that the respondents would 
either withdraw their claims or the court would find that there was no infringement). 
101 Maxwell Breana Obesi & Chrispas Nyombi, Enforcement of anti-suit injunctions, 36 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 513, 524–
25 (2015). 
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respondent from enforcing a handed-down judgment. But that explanation arguably misses the 
point. ASIs are not regarded as injurious to comity because they cast aspersions on the competence 
of a foreign court, but because they indirectly interfere with foreign proceedings even if they do 
not purport to direct what a foreign court should do (because they act in personam).102 On this view, 
AEIs would be equally (if not more) injurious to comity.  
Whether the second facet can be challenged depends on how exactly the waste of resources is 
conceptualised. Sun Travels appears to have endorsed an approach where there will always be a waste 
of resources if the foreign court has issued a judgment. It rejected the argument that because one 
Maldivian judgment spanned two and half pages, the effort expended must have been negligible.103 
This approach is likely to be accepted unless a court is prepared to pass judgment on the effort 
expended by its foreign counterpart based on factors such as the complexity of the case and 
duration of the hearing.  
On balance, the stricter approach to AEIs as opposed to ASIs, appears to be here to stay. In that 
light, it is also worthwhile recalling that even ASIs are not well-accepted across the common-civil 
law divide, being considered offensive in many quarters.104 
ii. Option 2: Seek to Expand the Categories of “Exceptional Circumstances” 
Next, a party seeking an AEI could seek to expand the categories of “exceptional circumstances.” The 
main circumstance identified in Sun Travels is fraud, under the umbrella of unconscionable conduct 
(the other category appears to be a negative stipulation – it is necessary but insufficient for an 
applicant to have brought its claim in a timely manner). While Ecobank also identified fraud, it did 
not go so far as to use unconscionability as a unifying rationalising doctrine. Beyond fraud, what 
else might suffice? On the approach in Sun Travels, the categories are not closed as long as the 
defect in the procuring of the foreign judgment is traceable to unconscionable conduct.105 
We suggest that unconscionability is not an appropriate unifying theme for the circumstances in 
which an AEI may be granted, notwithstanding the equitable roots of an injunction, because it is 
both over and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because unconscionability is associated with 
numerous doctrines, some of which transfer awkwardly to the grant of AEIs. For instance, a broad 
view of unconscionability may sometimes include duress or undue influence,106 but it is odd to 
claim that there has been undue influence in the procuring of a foreign judgment. In other 
contexts, unconscionability appears to have been used as a synonym for dishonest or reprehensible 
conduct.107  
 
102 Ecobank, [2015] EWCA (Civ.) 1309, ¶ 83; Sun Travels, [2019] SGCA 10, ¶ 69. 
103 Sun Travels, [2019] SGCA 10, ¶ 123.  
104 Obesi & Nyombi, Recognition of anti-suit injunctions in civil and common law jurisdictions, 36 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 473, 
474 (2015). 
105 Sun Travels, [2019] SGCA 10, ¶ 105 states as follows: “what is required for an AEI is exceptional circumstances tied 
to the notion of unconscionability and not exceptional circumstances in the abstract”. 
106 BOM v. BOK, [2018] SGCA 83, ¶ 118 (Sing.).   
107 UKAA, § 68(2)(g) permits the court award to set aside an award procured by fraud; Celtic Bioenergy Ltd v. Knowles 
Ltd. [2017] EWHC 472, ¶ 103 (Eng.). 
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It is under-inclusive because it would exclude doctrines such as breach of natural justice,108 which 
is a fairly uncontroversial ground for denying recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment.109 If such a judgment would be refused recognition and enforcement in any case, there 
would be no additional injury to comity (if indeed comity is the justification for a narrow test for 
granting AEIs) if an AEI were granted. It is also unclear whether the situation where a party could 
not have sought relief pre-judgment because the relevant agreement was reached post-judgment 
(accepted in Ecobank) can indeed be subsumed under unconscionable delay or fraud (as rationalised 
by Sun Travels). The better approach would therefore be the one in Ecobank, i.e., considering this 
as a standalone exception – if this exception ought to be recognised at all.  
If the court does indeed accept that “exceptional circumstances” may be assessed on a case by case 
basis without reference to unconscionability as a unifying principle (or indeed, any unifying 
principle because analytical clarity in the form of a grand unifying design may not always be 
possible or appropriate in all cases), the potential scenarios where an AEI will be available will be 
much broader.  
iii. Option 3: Accept alternatives to AEIs 
Given the difficulties involved in seeking an AEI, it is also worthwhile for a party to consider 
whether to pursue alternative relief. It is no longer open to such a party to seek a stay of 
proceedings.110 AEIs are, by definition, only necessary when foreign proceedings have concluded 
and judgment has been delivered. The viable alternatives are, thus, to pray: (i) that the breach of 
an arbitration agreement constitutes a defence to recognition and enforcement at common law, or 
(ii) for damages.  
Dealing first with defences, breach of agreement is in some jurisdictions a statutorily recognised 
defence. For instance, under Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, a foreign 
judgment must be denied recognition and enforcement if the bringing of the foreign proceedings 
was “contrary to an agreement under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings 
in the courts of that country.”111 A similar mechanism operates under Section 5(3)(b) of Singapore’s 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,112 which deems a foreign court not to have 
had jurisdiction if the action was brought in breach of agreement. These provisions would cover 
arbitration agreements. But it is unclear how far this defence exists at common law or how far 
courts will be willing to extend the rationale of this defence beyond where its application is 
mandated by statute.  
Alternatively, a party could seek damages for breach of arbitration agreement in lieu of an AEI. 
The reasoning in the case of ASIs, which applies by analogy to AEIs, runs thus that the arbitration 
clauses have both positive and negative aspects (i.e., taking the necessary steps to arbitrate, and an 
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undertaking not to sue other than in the agreed forum).113 Thus, in principle, damages should be 
available for their breach.114 Damages would compensate the innocent party for wasted legal costs 
in defending the parallel court proceedings,115 and potentially, losses above and beyond such 
expenditure (e.g., the amount of loss equivalent to that expended in satisfying a foreign judgment 
that was successfully enforced).116 
However, there are difficulties in claiming damages in lieu of an AEI, listed as follows: 
First, it is not universally accepted that the breach of an arbitration agreement can found a claim 
for substantive damages,117 because, in one view, arbitration agreements are procedural in nature.118 
Second, who should the remedy of damages be sought from: the seat court or a tribunal?119 The 
innocent party should opt for the latter because that would be consistent with his commitment to 
arbitrate,120 but it is questionable whether under most institutional model clauses a tribunal can 
award damages for breach of the arbitration agreement as opposed to the main contract.121 But this 
difficulty is surmountable by either rooting the tribunal’s power to award damages for breach of 
arbitration agreement in the law applicable to the agreement in question,122 or giving a broad 
approach to construction of the arbitration clause. Even so, damages in lieu of AEIs is evidently 
an imperfect remedy.  
D. Conclusion on Problem 3  
A party faced with a foreign judgment obtained in breach of an arbitration agreement may seek to 
obtain an AEI, but the conditions where an AEI are available are narrowly circumscribed. This 
seems to be the approach taken even in “pro-arbitration” jurisdictions such as England and 
Singapore. The importance of party autonomy and upholding parties’ agreement to arbitrate seems 
to take a backseat to concerns of international comity. The alternative remedies of breach of 
agreement as a defence to enforcement and damages for breach of arbitration agreement have 
their own limitations. Neither is a perfect substitute for an AEI. Once again, therefore, the old 
adage holds true: prevention, through getting a stay or an ASI, is better than cure. 
V. Problem 4: Enforcement of Arbitral Awards that have been Set Aside at the Seat 
One aspect of international arbitration which invariably requires the assistance of national courts 
is in the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. An award is toothless if it cannot be 
enforced against the assets of the award debtor. The NYC was, therefore, enacted to provide 
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common legislative standards for court recognition and enforcement of foreign and non-domestic 
arbitral awards.123 However, despite the attempts at harmonisation, there is substantial divergence 
over whether arbitral awards annulled by a seat court can nevertheless be enforced by the enforcing 
courts in another jurisdiction.  
A. Different Approaches to Article V(1)(e) of the NYC 
We take as our starting point Article V(1)(e) of the NYC, which states that recognition and 
enforcement of an award may be refused, if among other things: 
“The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was 
made.” [emphasis added] 
Some academics124 and national courts125 have interpreted Article V(1)(e) as imposing a mandatory 
obligation to refuse enforcement once an award has been set aside by the seat court. Some regard 
the term “may be refused” as an indication that the enforcement court still has the discretion to enforce 
an award notwithstanding that it may have been set aside by the seat court.126 
These divergent approaches are well-illustrated by the case of Nikolay Viktorovich Maximov v. Open 
Joint Stock Company “Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat” [“Maximov”]. 127  The International 
Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian 
Federation issued an arbitral award for almost USD 300 million in favour of Mr. Maximov.128 The 
award debtor, NMLK, applied to set aside the award in the Moscow court on the basis that two 
of the arbitrators had failed to disclose their connections to Mr. Maximov’s expert witnesses. But 
the judge also based her decision on two other grounds which were not argued by the parties, in 
relation to the public policy of Russia and the non-arbitrability of the dispute.129 Undeterred by the 
annulment at the seat court, Mr. Maximov sought enforcement of the award in Paris, Amsterdam 
and London.130 The French courts concluded that, the fact that the award had been set aside by 
the Russian courts was not sufficient to refuse recognition in France; the award had been procured 
in accordance with the parties’ agreed contractual method and it should, therefore, be recognised 
and enforced.131 In contrast, the Dutch courts held that an award set aside at the seat can only be 
enforced in the Netherlands under exceptional circumstances, for e.g., if giving effect to the 
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annulment judgment would violate Dutch public policy.132 On the evidence before it, there were no 
such exceptional circumstances. A similar outcome was arrived at by the English court.133 Mr. 
Maximov sought enforcement in London and argued that the Russian courts’ setting aside 
judgments should not be recognised, as they were clearly biased. Enforcement was refused because 
there was no “cogent evidence of bias.” 134 
B. Territorialism and Delocalisation 
The willingness of the French courts to enforce the annulled award, and the corresponding 
reluctance of the English and Dutch courts to do the same, broadly correspond to the two main 
schools of thought on this issue. “Territorialism” holds that arbitration is inextricably tied to the 
seat, the law of the seat exclusively regulates the arbitration, and so seat-court annulment kills the 
award for good.135 It ceases to have legal existence,136 making subsequent enforcement a legal 
impossibility.137 As explained by the Singapore Court of Appeal in the Astro case referred to in 
earlier sections: “the contemplated erga omnes effect of a successful application to set aside an award would generally 
lead to the conclusion that there is simply no award to enforce.”138 
In contrast, the “delocalisation” theory holds that the seat of the arbitration is chosen only for 
convenience.139 Arbitrators do not derive their powers solely from the seat’s laws, but from the 
sum of all the legal orders that recognise the validity of the arbitration agreement and the award.140 
Therefore, the decisions of the seat court have no bearing on the validity of the underlying award, 
and an enforcing court is free to decide whether to enforce an award based on its own domestic 
laws. The delocalisation theory is championed most famously by the French courts. In Arab Repub. 
of Egypt v. Chromalloy Aeroservs., Inc. [“Chromalloy”], the Paris Cour d’Appel succinctly summarised 
the position thus:141 
“[…] Considering finally that the award rendered in Egypt was an international award which by definition 
was not integrated into the legal order of that country such that its existence continues despite its nullification 
and that its recognition in France is not contrary to international public policy.” 
C. Evaluating the Merits of Each Approach – No Satisfactory Solution?  
i. Delocalisation 
It may be argued that delocalisation is more consistent with the plain words of the NYC. The 
phrase “may be refused” suggests that an enforcing state retains the discretion to enforce an award 
even if it has been set aside by a competent authority of the seat. The French cases also rely on the 
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Article VII “more favourable rights” provision to refer to its own domestic laws on the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards.142 It should be noted that the French approach may not work 
in every country; for e.g., in jurisdictions that have incorporated Article V(1)(e) of the NYC into 
their own domestic laws there would no longer be a “more favourable right” in domestic law.143 
Moreover, delocalisation better accords with parties’ intentions. By electing to arbitrate their 
dispute rather than submitting to the jurisdiction of any particular court, parties can be taken to 
have intended for extra-curial adjudication of their dispute. The “territorialist” approach contradicts 
parties’ intentions as it over-emphasises the seat court.  
However, a major drawback of the “delocalisation” approach is that it may severely detract from the 
finality and certainty of the arbitral decision, because it leaves the door open for the same issues 
to be re-litigated across multiple jurisdictions. One commentator has referred to these as “floating 
awards” which cannot be set aside once and for all,144 and which encourages forum shopping as 
unsuccessful claimants attempt to get multiple bites at the cherry. The high potential for conflicting 
decisions creates “systemic uncertainty”,145 which undermines the harmonisation objectives of the 
NYC and the Model Law, in turn leading to higher transaction costs for commercial parties.146 
In practice, however, these concerns might be somewhat overstated. Despite the fear of indefinite 
re-litigation, parties are realistically only concerned with the enforcement of awards in jurisdictions 
where the respondent has sizeable assets.147 Once those have been exhausted, there need not be 
any legitimate concerns that further enforcement actions will be taken in other jurisdictions.  
As for the risk of multiple conflicting decisions, this could in part be mitigated by the doctrine of 
issue estoppel. Issue estoppel typically arises when a foreign court of competent jurisdiction has 
decided on a specific issue between the same parties, which subsequently comes before another 
court for review.148 Where there is an identity of parties and facts, issue estoppel may apply such 
that the parties are bound by the findings of the first court that hears the matter.149 However, in 
the arbitration context, a distinction is sometimes drawn between decisions on distinctly domestic 
issues, such as public policy and arbitrability of disputes, and those which have a more international 
character, such as the interpretation of agreements or treaties.150 Issue estoppel is less likely to arise 
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in the former situation, given that the domestic courts of a particular jurisdiction would be best 
placed to decide such matters. Nevertheless, the application of issue estoppel would serve to 
reduce the instances of conflicting decisions on the same issues. It however remains to be seen 
whether such a typically common law doctrine will gain widespread adoption and acceptance in 
the civil law jurisdictions. 
ii. Territorialism 
The “territorialist” response is that the seat court’s exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over the award 
would be futile if that decision need not be recognised in other enforcement jurisdictions. Further, 
this would efface the distinction between setting aside and refusal of enforcement.151 Territorialism 
is not inconsistent with parties’ intentions because the parties have willingly submitted to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the seat court by agreeing on the seat of the arbitration (or, in a case 
where the choice of seat cannot be gleaned from the arbitration agreement, submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal to decide on the seat). 
The main concern that arises from the territorialist approach is that it accords too much deference 
to the seat court in relation to matters which should be in the purview of each State’s domestic 
courts. From an enforcing court’s perspective, it is difficult to see why an award which does not 
offend the public policy of the enforcing court should not be given effect to – simply because the 
seat court finds it objectionable by local standards.  
A few arguments against territorialism may be made. First, an enforcing court should not be 
hamstrung by the decision of the seat court on the status of the award, since the enforcing court 
has a strong interest in reviewing the award (it being the place where assets are actually seized).152 
Second, it would undermine confidence in international arbitration if even local standards (in the 
seat), that are perceived as improper or objectionable by the international community,153 must 
invariably be given effect to. This problem is illustrated by the case of Yukos Capital SARL v. OJSC 
Rosneft Oil Company [“Yukos”], 154  which involved a Russian-seated arbitration. The tribunal 
rendered four awards in favour of Yukos against Rosneft. Rosneft successfully applied to set aside 
the awards before the Moscow Arbitrazh court.155 Yukos nevertheless sought enforcement of the 
awards in Netherlands and England. Both the Amsterdam Court of Appeal and the English High 
Court held that the decision of the Moscow Arbitrazh court, setting aside the awards “was a result 
of a partial and dependent judicial process.”156 The English High Court added that to recognise such a 
decision would offend “basic principles of honesty, natural justice and domestic concepts of public policy.”157 
The Yukos case, therefore, demonstrates that there may be circumstances where it would be in the 
interests of justice to recognise an award even if it has been set aside. 
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D. The Way Forward 
Neither delocalisation nor territorialism presents a perfect approach. Delocalisation entirely 
disregards the decision of the seat court, generates uncertainty, and leads to wasted resources and 
costs due to re-litigation of a similar issue. On the other hand, strict territorialism unnecessarily 
restricts the capacity of an enforcement court to do justice under the right circumstances, as 
illustrated by the Yukos case. 
The best way forward may be a middle path between the two approaches. Chief Justice Sundaresh 
Menon of the Supreme Court of Singapore, speaking extra-judicially at a conference in New Delhi, 
proposed what is essentially a two-step approach:158 
1. The enforcing court should first decide whether it will recognise the seat court’s annulment 
decision, by applying its own domestic rules on the recognition of foreign judgments. If 
the seat court’s setting aside judgment is recognised, its decision should be respected, and 
enforcement should be refused. 
2. If the foreign judgment is recognised, the next question is whether it raises an issue 
estoppel in the enforcement proceedings. If so, the seat court decision is the final word on 
that issue. Issue estoppel would likely arise where the seat court has made a decision on 
grounds with more “transnational” resonance, such as on the basis of procedural 
irregularities. Conversely, if the ground for setting aside is one that has a distinctly domestic 
flavour, the seat court’s decision would not ordinarily be capable of founding an issue 
estoppel, and the enforcing court would be entitled to consider the matter afresh in 
accordance with its own domestic standards. 
The grounds of setting aside under Article 34 of the Model Law that, in the authors’ view, have 
greater “transnational resonance” are Article 34(2)(a)(ii) on improper notice or inability to present its 
case, Article 34(2)(a)(iii) on disputes outside the scope of submission to arbitration and Article 
34(2)(a)(iv) on the tribunal’s composition not according with the parties’ agreement or lex arbitri. 
Conversely, the grounds under Article 34(2)(b) which involve arbitrability of disputes and public 
policy would be grounds for setting aside with a distinctly domestic flavour.  
This proposed approach accords due deference to the decision of the seat court, in line with the 
“territorialist” approach, while also ensuring that the enforcement court retains discretion on 
matters involving its own domestic public policy, in line with the “delocalisation” theory. Such an 
approach also ensures that there is finality only when the decision of the seat court should properly 
be regarded as the final word on the matter. This would generally be in situations where the 
requirements for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment are met. For example, if a 
decision of the seat court is one that has not been arrived at through proper judicial processes, it 
would not be in the interest of parties for that decision to be accorded any sort of finality. Indeed, 
a foreign judgment which has been tainted by a breach of natural justice or unfairness would not 
likely be recognised in a foreign jurisdiction. In relation to issues of public policy, it should be each 
State’s domestic courts which deliver the conclusive determination. Therefore, an enforcing court 
is unlikely to enforce a foreign judgment which has been decided purely on the basis of the 
domestic public policy of that jurisdiction. Ultimately, there is no utility to be derived from finality 
 
158 Menon CJ’s Keynote Address, supra note 145, ¶ 23. 
VOLUME 8, ISSUE 2                     2020  
 
 42 
simply for the sake of finality, and courts should be afforded the flexibility to consider afresh 
whether to enforce a foreign arbitral award notwithstanding that it has been annulled in the seat 
court in the appropriate situations. 
The effectiveness of Menon CJ’s proposed approach is, in the authors’ view, bolstered by the 
Convention of February 01, 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters [“Hague Convention”], which was adopted by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law on July 02, 2019.159 The Hague Convention establishes 
common provisions on mutual recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions and leads to 
greater harmonisation and convergence in the recognition rules applied by each country. The 
Hague Conference presently has 83 members, including both civil and common law jurisdictions. 
E. Conclusion on Problem 4 
The extent to which a seat court’s decision on the status of an award should be conclusive has 
long been uncertain. Pragmatists may contend that there is an incentive for national jurisdictions 
to take differing positions on this issue, precisely to market their attractiveness as an enforcement 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the authors believe that the more principled way forward is to tread the 
middle ground between pure territorialism and delocalisation – a unified approach which better 
aligns itself to the objectives of NYC. 
VI. Problem 5: When can Enforcement be Refused under Article V(1)(d) of the NYC? 
In our discussion of Problem 4 above, we touched on the enforcement court’s residual discretion 
to allow enforcement even if a ground for refusal under Article V of the NYC has been made out, 
pursuant to the permissive language of Article V.160 Following from the discretionary nature of 
Article V, the approach varies by jurisdiction. In the final part of this article, we examine the 
approaches taken vis-à-vis Article V(1)(d) of the NYC, which states that recognition and 
enforcement of an award may be refused if: 
“The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement 
of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place.”161 
Specifically, some enforcement courts have read in a requirement for the award debtor to show 
that there has been a serious violation of the parties’ agreement, which in turn led to the award debtor 
suffering material prejudice (the material prejudice test) before enforcement will be refused. In 
contrast, other courts have held that any deviation from the parties’ agreement, no matter how 
slight (the minimal deviation test), would warrant refusal of enforcement. These approaches have 
been discussed below. 
A. The Material Prejudice Test  
One example of an enforcement court which has applied the material prejudice test is the 
Singapore High Court in Sanum Investments Limited v. ST Group Co, Ltd [“Sanum Investments 
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(HC)”]. 162  Two agreements were entered into between the parties: (1) a Master Agreement 
containing a multi-tiered dispute resolution clause providing for (amongst others) mediation 
followed by arbitration “using an internationally recognised mediation/arbitration Company in Macau”,163 
and (2) a Participation Agreement entered into in conjunction with the Master Agreement, which 
provided for arbitration at the SIAC before a three-member tribunal.164 The claimant commenced 
proceedings before a three-member tribunal seated in Singapore. Although the respondents 
objected and did not participate, the tribunal was satisfied that the dispute between the parties fell 
under the Participation Agreement, and eventually rendered an award in favour of the claimant.165 
The respondents sought to refuse enforcement relying on, amongst others, Article 36(1)(a)(iv) of 
the Model Law, which is the equivalent of Article V(1)(d) of the NYC.166 
Disagreeing with the tribunal, the court concluded that the underlying dispute was governed solely 
by the Master Agreement, and the proper seat of the arbitration was Macau.167 The appointment 
of a three-member tribunal was also not in accordance with the Master Agreement, because the 
Master Agreement was silent on this issue and the default position would be that prescribed by the 
chosen institutional rules (i.e., the SIAC rules which provided for a sole arbitrator).168 Nonetheless, 
enforcement was not refused. Since the respondents had not produced any evidence of prejudice 
arising out of what the court characterised to be procedural irregularities, they had failed to discharge 
their burden of proof.169 On appeal, the Singapore Court of Appeal accepted that “lack of prejudice 
is not relevant to a jurisdictional challenge but would be relevant to a procedural challenge”.170 The Singapore 
Court of Appeal explained that such differing treatment of procedural and jurisdictional challenges 
is justified because of the need to avoid misusing the applicable procedural provisions as a basis 
for denying the award on the ground that there was a minor or incidental breach of an unimportant 
term in the arbitration agreement.171 However, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the 
court below and held that it was not necessary for a party resisting enforcement of an award on 
the basis of a wrongly seated arbitration to demonstrate actual prejudice arising from the wrong seat.172 
The material prejudice test has also been adopted in a line of cases from the United States District 
Courts. In Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Hammermills, Inc. [“Hammermills”],173 the award 
debtor attempted to resist enforcement on the ground that the tribunal had breached the agreed 
arbitral procedure by inserting into the award the amount of legal costs to be assessed against a 
party after the draft award had been approved by the ICC International Court of Arbitration. The 
District Court rejected this contention, and held that the award should be set aside “only if such 
violation worked substantial prejudice to the complaining party.”174 The test has also been adopted in the 
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District Court decision in Karaha Bodas Company, LLC v Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas 
Bumi Negara.175 
B. The Slight Deviation Test  
Other enforcement courts have adhered strictly to the parties’ agreement and refused enforcement 
without requiring the award debtor to show serious breach of material prejudice.  
In Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc. [“Polimaster”],176 the dispute resolution clause in the parties’ 
agreement required the settlement of disputes by negotiation, and failing that, “by means of arbitration 
at the defendant’s side,” which the parties agreed referred to the geographical location of the 
defendant’s place of business. The claimant in the arbitration correctly commenced arbitration 
against the respondent in California (the respondent’s place of business), with the reservation that 
no counterclaims could be filed because, pursuant to the dispute resolution clause, counterclaims 
against the claimant could only have been filed in Belarus (the claimant’s place of business). But 
the respondent did end up making several counterclaims, which the arbitrator declined to dismiss 
because it would be contrary to “notions of fairness, judicial economy and efficiency” to “[p]rosecut[e] a claim 
with affirmative defences in one venue while simultaneously prosecuting counterclaims almost identical to the 
affirmative defences in another [venue].” 177  The arbitrator dismissed the claims and allowed the 
counterclaim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, adopting a strict 
construction of the dispute resolution clause, held that the counterclaims should have been 
brought against the claimant in Belarus. The court “must enforce the parties’ agreement according to its 
terms, even if the result is inefficient.”178 
The approach taken by the court in Polimaster clearly prioritises party autonomy. Not only was the 
court unconcerned about whether the appellants had suffered material prejudice, it also 
disregarded the efficiency gains of having the entire matter heard in the same set of proceedings. 
We note here that the deviation from the parties’ agreement in this case was in relation to the 
choice of the seat. 
In the Hong Kong case of China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai 
Holdings Co Ltd [“China Nanhai Oil”],179 refusal of enforcement was sought on the basis that 
parties had selected arbitrators from the Shenzhen list of arbitrators when the arbitration 
agreement specified for selection from the Beijing list. The Supreme Court of Hong Kong refused 
enforcement on this ground because the arbitrators technically did not have jurisdiction to decide 
the dispute,180 though it should be noted that enforcement was ultimately allowed because the party 
objecting to enforcement had taken part in the arbitration despite being aware that the arbitrators 
were chosen from the wrong list.181  
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Another example of a case where the court refused enforcement of an award due to the improper 
composition of the arbitral tribunal was Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 
[“Universalis”].182 The clause provided that, amongst others, if the two arbitrators chosen by the 
parties could not reach consensus on a third arbitrator, the third arbitrator would be appointed by 
the Tribunal of Commerce of the Seine. The appellant prematurely requested the Tribunal of 
Commerce of the Seine to appoint a third arbitrator.183 It was held that the premature appointment 
of the third arbitrator “irremediably spoiled the arbitration process.”184 The manner in which the third 
arbitrator was to be appointed was “more than a trivial matter of form. Article V(1)(d) of the New York 
Convention itself suggests the importance of the arbitral composition, as failure to comport with an agreement’s 
requirements for how arbitrators are selected [was] one of only seven grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitral 
award.”185 As the court noted: 
“As to the complaint that this exalts form over substance, at the end of the day, we are left with the fact 
that the parties explicitly settled on a form and the NYC requires that their commitment be respected.”186 
C. Reconciling the Authorities and a Way Forward 
The material prejudice test approach is in line with the pro-enforcement aims of the NYC. By 
preventing relatively trivial deviations from the agreed arbitral procedure from resulting in the non-
recognition of an award,187 it, in the authors’ view, prevents Article V(1)(d) from being used as a 
hair-trigger for non-recognition. The pro-enforcement approach in this regard reflects how 
procedural matters are generally subject to minimal curial intervention in arbitration.188 On the 
other hand, the material prejudice test view has been criticised for detracting from party autonomy, 
because deviations from parties’ agreed procedure may end up being disregarded more frequently. 
Party autonomy is yet another underlying principle of the NYC, as reflected in how the NYC does 
away with the previous requirement in Article 1(c) of the 1927 Geneva Convention on the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards that there be a departure from procedure as set out in both 
the parties’ agreement and the lex arbitri. Against this, the converse would apply to the slight 
deviation test.  
Having regard to the pros and cons of each test, we contend that the material prejudice test should 
be confined to cases where the alleged non-compliance is in relation to the parties’ agreement on 
procedure. The slight deviation test should apply to jurisdictional defects and errors pertaining to 
the seat, in respect of which refusal of enforcement should be more readily granted. This would 
strike the appropriate balance between party autonomy and ensuring that awards are not refused 
enforcement too readily. As George A. Bermann argues, the procedural/jurisdictional distinction 
is significant not only because the policy of minimal curial intervention does not apply to 
jurisdictional defects, but also because it would be practically very difficult to affirmatively 
demonstrate prejudice for jurisdictional defects.189 It is possible to determine “what would have been” 
for procedural errors that are discrete and contained events, but not so where the deviation from 
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the agreement relates to tribunal composition (which depends on human interactions and 
dynamics).190 Moreover, where the defect pertains to the selection of the seat, the loss of the right 
to seek annulment of the award that would eventually be rendered in a competent court of the 
agreed seat is inherently prejudicial.191  
This approach would reconcile the cases mentioned above: in Hammermills, the material prejudice 
test applied because the defect was procedural. In Polimaster, the slight deviation test applied 
because the problem pertained to the seat, while in both China Nanhai Oil and Encyclopaedia 
Universalis, the slight deviation test applied because the alleged defect was with the composition of 
the tribunal. Indeed, none of the cases where awards were enforced, (notwithstanding some 
deviation from the parties’ agreement in relation to procedural issues) involved deviations from 
the chosen seat, except the Sanum Investments (HC) case, which has been overruled by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal. 
D. Conclusion on Problem 5 
It is acknowledged that the line between a procedural and jurisdictional defect may not always be 
clear. For example, if the deviation from the parties’ choice of seat affects little more than the 
procedural rules that are applied, should this still be regarded as a jurisdictional error when the 
effect is relatively trivial? Be that as it may, the authors think that the application of the material 
prejudice test in cases of procedural defects will ensure that arbitral awards are not set aside for 
trivial reasons, thereby maintaining the legitimacy and effectiveness of international arbitration. 
VII. Conclusion  
Hence in answer to the questions posed at the beginning:  
1. Appeals to a national court may be permitted under statute, though these rarely succeed in 
practice. Appeals to an appellate tribunal are likely to be permitted. However, appeals from 
a national court to a tribunal should not be allowed.  
2. Failure to request the seat court to determine the tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 16(3) 
of the Model Law should generally preclude later attempts to set aside the award on the 
same jurisdictional ground, unless the Article 16(3) mechanism is not reasonably available. 
But the failure to invoke Article 16(3) should not preclude reliance on the same ground to 
resist enforcement.  
3. AEIs are difficult to obtain. The alternative remedies of breach of agreement as a defence 
to enforcement and damages for breach of arbitration agreement have their own 
limitations. Therefore, a party’s best bet is to obtain a stay or an ASI.  
4. A middle path should be struck between delocalisation and territorialism. The enforcing 
court should first decide whether it will recognise the seat court’s annulment decision. If 
recognition is denied, it would not be constrained by the decision. If the foreign judgment 
is recognised, the next question is whether it raises an issue estoppel in the enforcement 
proceedings. If so, the seat court’s decision has the final say.  
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5. The material prejudice test should be confined to cases where the alleged non-compliance 
with the parties’ agreement is a procedural one. The slight deviation test should apply to 
jurisdictional defects and errors pertaining to the seat, in respect of which refusal of 
enforcement should be more readily granted. 
Extrapolating from these answers, although jurisdictions are sometimes identified as “pro-
arbitration” or “arbitration-friendly,” there is, in reality no jurisdiction that seeks to enforce foreign 
arbitral awards regardless of the circumstances of the particular case. While party autonomy can 
be given great weight and underpin a general stance of minimal curial intervention, there are always 
limits. For e.g., the Singapore courts have adopted a more sympathetic stance towards procedural 
breaches, by accepting the material prejudice test for refusing enforcement of an award under 
Article V(1)(d) of the NYC. This promotes the enforcement and recognition of awards, and 
bolsters the legitimacy and efficacy of international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
But in the same vein, the Singapore courts have indicated that if an award has been set aside at the 
seat, it will accord primacy to the judgment of the seat court and refuse enforcement of the award. 
Other examples of approaches taken by the Singapore courts which are not, at first glance, 
regarded as strictly pro-arbitration include for example, adopting a narrow approach when deciding 
whether to grant an AEI even if there has been a breach of an agreement to arbitrate.  
The authors are therefore of the view that to label a jurisdiction as being pro or anti-arbitration is 
a false dichotomy. Even a court which aims to be a “promoter” of arbitration has an equally 
important role as a “regulator” of the arbitral process. Indeed, for arbitration to flourish, it is of 
paramount importance for national courts to create laws which are fair and just, even if it means 
that party autonomy has to temporarily take a backseat.  
Much like zombies, these perennial questions – and the broader controversy over the interaction 
between courts and tribunals – never die. And exactly like zombies, they gnaw at the brain. The 
debate will continue to rage. But in the meantime, we are pretty sure that the arbitration fraternity 
will keep calm and carry on. 
